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ABSTRACT: The economies of the Pacific Basin have been much more
successful than those in other areas during the 1980s. Economic growth in the
Pacific has been high and inflation has been well contained. Five factors seem
to be most important in explaining this success. First, these economies have
managed to form a consensus to promote growth rather than other societal goals.
Second, the people work very hard. Third, they save and invest an unusually
large share of their current incomes. Fourth, they implement market-conforming
economic policies that are particularly outward looking. Finally, these econo-
mies benefit from a regional factor that comes from being surrounded by other
successful countries. Leadership in the Pacific Basin has been supplied only by
the United States; however, Japan has taken on a more prominent role in recent
years and may become dominant in the future.
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T HE variance in economic performance between different areas of the world
in the 1980s is remarkable, as shown in
Table 1. Observers of Latin America refer
to this decade as one of crisis from begin-
ning to end. The economic situation of
most African countries deteriorated from
an already minimal standard of living.
While there was stirring in Europe toward
the end of the 1980s, most of the decade
was characterized by stagnation and high
unemployment, above 10 percent. By way
of contrast, some economic progress was
made in North America, albeit at the cost
of creating a structural economic problem
in the United States. Most striking of all,
however, was the rapid economic advance
made by the developing countries in the
Pacific Basin, defined here as the 14 econ-
omies that participate in the Pacific Eco-
nomic Cooperation Conference.
The economic achievement of the Pa-
cific Basin is shown in Table 2. The picture
that emerges is one of continuing economic
prosperity during the 1980s. The 1980s in
fact compare very favorably to the eco-
nomic progress made in the previous two
decades. Inflation rates have tended to be
lower than in the 1970s, and economic
growth of the newly industrializing econo-
mies has been at a peak level. The Pacific
Basin has not been immune to the distur-
bances affecting the world economy, how-
ever, so that every country in the region has
suffered from some sort of slowdown or
recession at some point during the 1980s.
Nevertheless, these economies recovered
from the second oil shock and its after-
math, and they resumed rapid growth.
What accounts for this success com-
pared to that of countries in other regions?
First should be noted a few factors that
were not responsible. The decline of raw-
material prices - the so-called terms of trade
shock-that inhibited natural-resource ex-
porters in Latin America and Africa also
afflicted the natural-resource exporters of
the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions, yet these countries performed much
better. Also Korea, the Philippines, and
Indonesia were major debtor countries at
the start of the decade, but only in the case
of the Philippines is external debt seen as a
serious constraint on growth, and then only
along with other, more important prob-
lems. The differences in economic perfor-
mance must be found elsewhere, that is, not
in the external environment, although the
external environment was at least benign
in the Pacific.
The answer to why the economic per-
formance of the Pacific Basin has been
better can be attributed to factors internal
to each country and to the intense eco-
nomic interaction between countries in the
Pacific. One factor of grcat importance is
thc societal commitment to growth in each
country. This means that it was possible to
form a political consensus to make short-
run sacrifices to promote long-term
growth. This has permitted these countries
to react faster to external shocks than other
countries. A second factor was the willing-
ness of people to work hard. While the
number of working hours in a typical week,
the number of holidays per year, and the
like differ greatly from country to country,
in general, the people in the Pacific work
longer and possibly more intensively than
people elsewhere.
High savings rates and high domestic
investment rates found in Pacific Basin
countries constitute a third factor helping
to explain their success. Fourth, govern-
ments in the region tended to implement
market-conforming economic policies.
One strong characteristic of these policies




SOURCES: Offcial national income data; U.S. National Committee for Pacific Economic Coop-
eration, Pacific Economic Outlook, 1989-1990 (San Francisco: U.S. National Committee for Pacific
Economic Cooperation, 1989).
*The figures for 1988 are estimates.
possible by the benign external environ-
ment. Finally, there is something that could
be called a regional effect, that is, an intan-
gible bonus that comes from being sur-
rounded by other successful countries. The
remainder of this article is devoted to an
elaboration of some of these factors.
SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT
BEHAVIOR
Economists interested in development
have long moved away from models and
theories that explain growth only on the
basis of rates of capital investment.
Clearly, many factors are important to the
complex social phenomenon that results in
economic advance. Furthermore, huge
amounts of capital investment can and
have been wasted in countries where capi-
tal markets were distorted or where politics
dictated the allocation of new investment.
Indeed, in such economies large invest-
ment shares did not lead to rapid growth.
Nevertheless, investment does matter, and
particularly that investment financed by
domestic savings.
Some evidence of savings and invest-
ment behavior of Pacific countries is
shown in Table 3. Category averages have
been included to aid comparisons; catego-
ries are those used by the World Bank. An
interesting difference can be noted be-
tween the share of gross savings in gross
domestic product in 1965 and in 1986. In
1965, four of the nine developing countries
in the region had savings rates below the
average of their category, one was the
same, and only four were higher. By 1986,
however, seven of the nine countries were
above average and generally substantially
above the average of the category. The only
two exceptions in 1986 were Hong Kong
and the Philippines, which was subject to
political disruption, but subsequently the
savings rate there has risen along with eco-
nomic recovery.
It is not patently obvious why high do-
mestic savings should be so growth pro-
moting. Of course, investment requires
109
TABLE 3
GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT AND GROSS DOMESTIC
SAVINGS AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
SOURCE: World Bank, World Development Report 1988, pp. 230-31.
savings, but they need not be domestic
savings. Domestic investment can be fi-
nanced from abroad through foreign aid,
borrowing, and foreign direct investment
(FDI). Indeed, since the essence of indus-
trial growth of developing countries in-
volves increasing technological sophisti-
cation, and since FDI usually brings tech-
nology transfers from abroad, FDI could
well be more growth promoting than an
equivalent amount of investment financed
by domestic sources. Nevertheless, the les-
son that can be drawn from the experience
of the Pacific Basin is that domestic sav-
ings capacity is crucial.
The main reason why domestic savings
are so important is that they permit a high
level of domestic investment without in-
curring foreign debt. As the Latin Ameri-
can experience demonstrates, foreign debt
can turn out to be much more difficult to
service than was anticipated at the time it
was undertaken. Even concessional for-
eign borrowing can be burdensome if, as in
the case of Indonesia, it is denominated in
a currency, such as the yen, that is appreci-
ating and the country’s exports are priced
in a depreciating currency. The gain from
financing domestic investment from do-
mestic savings may also arise in part from
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the automatic containment of inflation if
consumption is self-constrained. In any
event, the savings rate did rise rapidly in
the developing countries of the Pacific
Basin and economic growth did accelerate.
If domestic savings are crucial for
growth, can the domestic savings rate be a
direct target of government policy? It is
sometimes argued in the United States that
it cannot be manipulated directly, although
macroeconomic management, the struc-
ture of taxes, and the like are believed to
influence it. In most countries in the Pacific
Basin, the savings rate has been an explicit
target of policy. For example, Singapore
has devised an elaborate Central Providen-
tial Fund to force a high rate of personal
savings as part of a program to raise na-
tional savings. Japanese policy in earlier
periods was aimed at suppressing domestic
consumption to promote higher savings.
Other examples could be cited. While
cause and effect are difficult to document,
comprehensive government programs to
raise national savings rates and the
achievement of that result are positively
correlated.
As also seen in Table 3, the Pacific
Basin economies with few exceptions dis-
play high investment shares compared to
category averages. The advantage of high
investment shares needs no elaboration. It
may well be, however, that high invest-
ment and high savings come out of a joint
decision process by domestic entrepre-
neurs and that it is the action of these
entrepreneurs that helps explain economic
success.
OUTWARD-ORIENTED POLICY
The outward orientation of the policy of
the economies of the Pacific Basin is
widely recognized, and some observers at-
tribute a major share of their success to this
factor. While only a subjective determina-
tion is possible, it may well be that its
importance as usually analyzed is exagger-
ated but that, when seen in its full dimen-
sion, it is not fully appreciated.
Outward orientation is usually charac-
terized by a country’s policy toward inter-
national trade and FDI. It is certain that
almost every developing economy in the
region - and that now includes China -
considered itself too small to develop in a
closed market, and therefore expanding in-
dustrial production and exporting indus-
trial products went hand in hand. For ex-
ample, Korea could never capture econo-
mies of scale by producing manufactures
only for the domestic market. Hence export
promotion was at the very heart of indus-
trial policy in these countries. This does not
mean, however, that they endorsed or prac-
ticed free trade themselves, even though
they advocated it for their trading partners.
Rather, they instituted mercantilist poli-
cies, that is, they limited imports while
promoting exports. This was the Japanese
plan for development, which was seen as a
successful model to emulate.
All of the developing countries in the
region, with one exception, practiced im-
port substitution (IS). The policy was based
on the usual infant-industry argument. One
consequence of IS is the nurturing and
training of domestic entrepreneurs and per-
mitting them to amass some risk capital.
The exception, of course, was Hong Kong,
which did not restrict imports; this is the
exception that proves the rule. The origin
of Hong Kong’s entrepreneurs was Shang-
hai and Canton. The training and the
amassing of capital that they needed were
provided by China’s trade restrictions be-
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fore they departed. Hence Hong Kong re-
ceived the benefits of an IS policy without
having to implement it.
Nevertheless, the practice of IS in the
Pacific Basin has been different from that
in other regions. Even at its peak, it was
never as extreme as elsewhere. In some
places, such as Malaysia and Singapore, it
was very mild indeed. Furthermore, it
seems to have ended sooner in the process
of development. Nevertheless, it still per-
sists, and rather restrictive import regimes
are still found in Indonesia, the Philippines,
and, until quite recently, Korea. The major
point of difference, however, was the focus
in the region on promoting exports rather
than restricting imports per se. Thus gener-
ous exceptions from import barriers were
permitted when their existence directly
threatened exports.
Policies toward FDI have differed greatly
between the countries in the region. During
its period of rapid industrial growth, Japan
made it very difficult for foreign firms to
undertake equity investments. Korea emu-
lated Japanese policy, but not so vigorously.
By way of contrast, Hong Kong never made
a distinction between domestic investment
and FDI, and Singapore has actively en-
couraged investment by multinational cor-
porations (MNCs). During the latter 1980s,
FDI has been particularly important in the
rapid growth of Thailand and, to a lesser
extent, Malaysia. This would not have been
possible if restrictive policies had been in
place. Ironically, the goal of policy in coun-
tries that promoted FDI, such as Singapore,
was not much different from that in Korea,
which closely regulated it. In both cases,
the purpose was to promote exports. Since
the Singapore market was too small to be
of much interest to MNCs, if they invested
in Singapore, it must have only been for the
purpose of exporting most of the output. Sim-
ilarly, Korea regulated FDI for the purpose of
ensuring that a major component of output
would be exported directly or indirectly.
The same variance in policy is seen with
respect to other kinds of international cap-
ital flows. For example, Hong Kong freely
permits capital flows in and out of the
territory, while Korea still does not permit
foreigners to make portfolio investments
directly into its stock market or buy real
estate. In general, it can be said that current-
account items - goods and services - have
been treated more liberally than capital-
account items throughout the region.
An important point to recognize, how-
ever, is that outward orientation goes be-
yond policies dealing with trade and for-
eign investment. The economies in this
region give constant attention to more suc-
cessful countries for the purpose of learn-
ing from their experience. This has been
described as the &dquo;flying-goose&dquo; pattern of
development, in which followers mimic
the leaders and try to catch up to them. The
search is for a successful pattern that then
can be adapted for domestic use. Both the
copying and the adapting are important in
this process. It is this larger sense of out-
ward orientation that is not frequently ap-
preciated and that provides the regional




The participation of governments in the
process of economic development in the
region is sometimes misunderstood. The
difficulty occurs because a distinction is
not drawn between market-distorting ac-
tivities of government and the intrusive-
ness of government in general. It is true that
there is much less market-distorting activ-
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ity in this region, but this should not be
interpreted as the practice of laissez-faire,
except in Hong Kong. Singapore is a per-
fect illustration of the point. The govern-
ment of Singapore does not distort mar-
kets, but it is very intrusive in running the
economy. The purpose of this government
activity is not to replace the market but to
make the market work better and faster. An
expression of this in the United States
would be an active and intrusive antitrust
policy.
Governments in the Pacific Basin do
many things to guide the market, and if
successful, without distorting it. A major
area of government participation has been
as an entrepreneur in state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs). Generally, the rationale has
been that the capital requirement and/or the
risk is too great for private entrepreneurs,
or simply that private enterprise did not
choose to undertake the activity and gov-
ernment has moved in to fill the vacuum.
At different times SOEs have loomed very
large in the economies of Korea, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Taiwan. Recently, some
privatization has occurred, and more is
talked about. Privatization has advanced
not because government activity was
deemed to be illegitimate but rather be-
cause, like the POSCO steel complex in
Korea, it has achieved maturity, earned
considerable profits, and no longer needs
government participation.
A second major activity of governments
in the region has been the promotion of
science and technology in industry. Gov-
ernments have recognized the critical role
of technology in industrial growth and
have been prepared to give the market
some encouragement to push the process
along. Major efforts have been made in
education. Indeed, once universal literacy
was achieved, the mastering of technical
skills was given top priority. At first that
meant sending students abroad to study.
Subsequently, domestic facilities were cre-
ated. Taiwan has been most active in this
regard. Frequently, government labora-
tories were created to promote scientific
work and even to do contract research for
business that the firm was incapable of
doing itself. Government institutes have
been formed to provide a clearinghouse for
technical information for business. Korea
has extensively utilized such organiza-
tions. In Singapore many SOEs operate in
advanced technical areas, and MNCs are
encouraged to bring high technology to the
country. Finally, practically all of the coun-
tries give encouragement to research and
development and to technical training
through special tax provisions.
Some governments in the region were
even more involved in directing their econ-
omies. In the 1970s, Korea’s development
plans were used to direct private invest-
ment decisions. The government provided
subsidized loans to firms if they would
follow the government’s suggestions. Fur-
thermore, in Singapore and Korea the gov-
emment became involved in wage setting
for the economy. Another illustration of
government involvement is in Malaysia,
where the distribution of income and wealth
has been a major target of policy. All of
these cases depict activist governments.
How much of the economic success of
these countries can be attributed to activist
policies is a matter of dispute. When they
were successful, they did not distort mar-
kets, but mistakes were made. In the later
1970s, Singapore restricted wage growth
too intensively and created a labor short-
age. To correct the shortage, wages were
pushed up too rapidly, which contributed
to a loss of competitiveness. In Korea in the
1970s, too much incentive was given for
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investment in heavy and chemical indus-
tries and as a result, overcapacity was cre-
ated, losses were made by operating firms,
and loans went into default. These mistakes
were unusual, however. Most of the time
the economies performed quite well and
were assisted by policy measures.
As economies grow larger, however, it
becomes increasingly harder to design pol-
icy that is intrusive, not market distorting,
and helpful for growth. Larger economies
are necessarily more complex. It becomes
increasingly difficult for governments to
have the information necessary for sound
decisions. Allocative decisions are better
made by private economic agents with di-
rect interest in the outcomes and closer to
markets. Hence there has been a move to-
ward liberalization of government regula-
tions, along with a pulling back of direct
governmental economic involvement in
recent years.
THE ROLE OF THE
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
The flying-goose pattern of develop-
ment in the Pacific Basin requires a leader
to point the way. For most of the postwar
period, that position was clearly filled by
the United States. It was the United States
that provided the technology that was
transferred to others. It was to American
universities that students went to study sci-
ence, engineering, and social science as
well. It was U.S.-based MNCs that made
direct investments in the region, which
forged organic links not only back to the
United States but also to third countries in
the region. It was the U.S. government that
provided direct aid-at times in large
amounts - to other governments, such as to
Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, and
Thailand. It was U.S. foundations that sup-
ported training and research in and about
the region. It was the United States,
through its support of international institu-
tions such as the World Bank and the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, that
provided resources and an inviting external
environment.
Possibly the greatest contribution that
the United States made to the success of
countries in the region was through having
an open market that absorbed huge vol-
umes of imported manufactures, permit-
ting the success of an export-led growth
strategy. In addition, U.S. power was criti-
cal in defining and stabilizing the political
and security dimensions of the region.
The apex of American relative eco-
nomic power was reached rather early in
the postwar period. As European countries
recovered from the war, and Japan not only
recovered but entered a period of unparal-
leled economic acceleration, the relative
position of the United States declined. The
decline was speeded by U.S. involvement
in Vietnam; however, in the 1970s, no other
country was in position to challenge U.S.
leadership. This changed in the 1980s as a
result of U.S. policy choices and further
acceleration of growth in the Pacific.
In the 1980s the United States no longer
is the richest industrial country. When mea-
sured on a per capita basis in terms of
international purchasing power-current
exchange rates-the income level of Japan
and several European countries has sur-
passed that of the United States. The
United States has begun to run a huge
imbalance of trade, the value of imports
becoming much greater than the value of
exports. In order to finance this deficit, the
United States annually has to borrow large
amounts abroad. The cumulation of this
borrowing has quickly turned the United
States into the world’s largest debtor where
previously it was the largest creditor.
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The competitor for economic leader-
ship in the Pacific Basin is Japan. Even in
the 1960s, the Japanese model for develop-
ment was being emulated in the region.
Furthermore, Japan has long been the pri-
mary market for natural-resource goods
produced in the region, hence the strong
link between Australia and Japan. More-
over, Japanese firms rather early began to
invest abroad for various purposes, relying
upon the information channels of the gen-
eral trading companies (sogo shosha). The
Pacific Basin was the natural recipient of
much of this investment. Recognizing its
special role in the Pacific, Japan became
the principal sponsor and force within the
Asian Development Bank.
By the 1980s, Japanese business firms
had begun to be recognized as world lead-
ers. Where earlier they were known to be
particularly competitive in heavy indus-
tries such as steel and shipbuilding, this
competitiveness was explained in terms of
greater capital investment. Now Japanese
firms excel in high-technology industries.
While the total size of the Japanese econ-
omy is smaller than that of the European
Community or the United States, its indus-
trial organization is also more concen-
trated. Hence the leading firms in Japan are
at least the equal of those in other countries.
It is Japanese management practices that
are being studied intensively and being
emulated everywhere. Since the apprecia-
tion of the yen, Japanese MNCs have been
making large investments throughout the
region and particularly in the United
States. In some places, such as Thailand,
Japanese firms dominate the scene. In
many industries and in many countries, the
goose leading the flock is Japanese.
With the shift in economic policy to-
ward domestic-oriented growth in the late
1980s, Japanese markets are being opened
to the imports of manufactured goods, and
most of them are coming from Pacific
Basin countries. Between 1985 and 1988,
Japanese imports of manufactured goods
increased by 80 percent, as measured in
dollars. Korean exports have grown partic-
ularly fast in this market. Some of these
goods are produced by Japanese . FDI in
several countries. Hence at the margin,
Japan is already replacing the United
States.
It is in the financial area, however, that
Japanese relative power is the greatest. As
a result of high domestic savings rates
combined with a high level of income, the
potential for Japanese investment is un-
matched. Japanese institutions such as
banks and insurance companies that per-
form the financial intermediary function
have become so large as to dwarf their
foreign competitors.
During the 1980s, Japan has developed
almost as large a balance-of-payments sur-
plus as the United States has developed a
deficit. This surplus has been invested pri-
marily in U.S. securities but in other for-
eign assets as well. Japan is clearly the
largest source of foreign capital in the
world.
Until recently Japan has been reluctant
to take a visible leadership position in the
Pacific Basin, but that is beginning to
change. Japan has recently become the
largest giver of foreign aid. The Japanese
have become more willing to offer their
own ideas for the solution of regional or
even world problems. For example, the
Japanese put forth a plan to deal with the
debt problem of the less developed coun-
tries. Japan has also taken upon itself to
become the spokesperson for the interest of
Pacific countries in the annual summit
meeting of industrial countries. Given
Japan’s relative economic power, a further
evolution in the direction of assuming lead-
ership should be expected.
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FUTURE PROSPECTS
Given uncertainties in all dimensions,
true forecasting of major economic devel-
opments is close to worthless. Neverthe-
less, it is interesting to extrapolate existing
trends to form a naive scenario of future
prospects. Two trends will be assumed to
continue: the relative economic success of
the Pacific Basin and the rise of Japanese
leadership.
The examination of the forces promot-
ing relative economic success in the Pacific
Basin yields systemic explanations that
need not be terminated. Their applicability
could spread from one country to another
in the region. Indeed, if the Pacific were
believed to have discovered the key to eco-
nomic success, then emulation might take
place in other regions. What would this
mean? There would be a resurgence of the
classical virtues of saving and investing for
the future. There would be a new reluc-
tance by governments to distort markets.
The importance of international trade
would be enhanced. Activist governments
would gear their policy toward export pro-
motion. The consequence might well be the
multiplication of large private enterprises
with a global focus.
The further enhancement of Japan’s
economic leadership might mean that the
modalities by which business is conducted
in Japan would determine the nature of
international regimes, just as the trade sys-
tem of the 1950s and 1960s reflected the
United States. The international trade of
Japan is managed by a handful of large
firms (keiretsu) in a cooperative and col-
laborative relationship with the govern-
ment, namely, with the Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry. Other countries
have found that they need similar business
firms and relationships to compete and ne-
gotiate with the Japanese. Hence a new era
of rapidly expanding but managed interna-
tional trade might emerge.
The financial strength of Japan must in
time be reflected in the institutions and
practices of the marketplace. International
commerce, especially in the Pacific, will
become increasingly dependent on Japa-
nese financing. Japanese financial institu-
tions have a natural advantage in obtaining
access to yen. Thus the competitive posi-
tion of Japanese institutions will be en-
hanced by increasing the international role
of the yen, and they can be expected to
promote such usage. There is every reason
to expect that they will be successful. In
fact, there is a strong possibility that the
world will accept the yen as its key cur-
rency, replacing the dollar. Key-currency
status is not determined by the issuer of a
currency but by its foreign users. If traders
and investors earn most of their income in
yen and must make payment in yen, then
the yen will become the unit of account, the
transaction currency, and the choice for
reserve accumulation.
Nothing has been said in this article
about Europe, and clearly the movement
toward closer integration within the Euro-
pean Community by 1992 is a major devel-
opment. What if Europe is unwilling to
accept the Pacific Century under Japanese
leadership? After all, the major motivation
for 1992 is to strengthen European compet-
itiveness so as not to be dominated by the
United States and Japan. Europe could
react to the competitive challenge of the
Pacific by turning inward and erecting bar-
riers to the outside world.
European exclusiveness, should it
occur, would likely be met by some sort of
regional development in the Pacific. Un-
like earlier decades after World War II,
when security concerns prevented an eco-
nomic schism between nonsocialist coun-
tries, the relaxation of tensions between the
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military superpowers is likely to permit
more diversity of economic relations. The
fact that the world would split up into re-
gional blocs does not mean that they would
necessarily be aggressive toward one an-
other. Indeed, there would be great eco-
nomic and political incentive to avoid con-
flict. Nevertheless, there would be legal
and practical distinctions between mem-
bers and nonmembers. The Pacific bloc
under Japanese leadership would be pros-
perous and dynamic, and very attractive to
many countries.
